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Rif raiding and piracy had been escalating over the previous years so at the started of 1893 Juan García y Magallo, the Spanish governor of Melilla, began to expand the fortifications surrounding the city (Wikipedia: First Rif War).
In particular the Spanish built new redoubts at Peuta de Cabiza and Punta Dolossos (Wikipedia: First Rif War). One of the redoubts was about 1,000 m from the walls, and more importantly near the tomb of a Riffi saint, Sidi Guariach (or Aguariach or Auriach) (Furneaux, 1967; Woolman, 1968). This activity provoked the local Berber population and Rif warriors began to muster in the mountains.
On 3 Oct 1893 6,000 Riffi warriors attacked Melilla (Wikipedia: First Rif War). They had Remington rifles but lacked heavy weapons. The Riffi captured the unfinished redoubt near the saints tomb, and killed 20 men of the Spanish garrison as they retreated across the stony plain to the city (Furneaux, 1967). Both the citizen population and the garrison retreated into the citadel. The Spanish were heavily outnumbered with only 400 regular infantry and a rapidly formed civilian corps to defend the city, but they had the advantage of artillery. In the absence of heavy weapons the Rif were forced to frontally assaulted the citadel, charging up the road ways and scaling the walls. Spaniards gunfire inflicted 160 casualties on the attackers and drove them back. The Spanish lost 21 dead and 100 wounded on the first day. Spanish artillery also began to shell Rif bands assembling in neighbouring villages. An unlucky shot demolished a mosque outside of the city and changed the nature of the war, turning it into a religious jihad.
The Spanish government immediately put the fleet on alert, mobilized the Army of Andalusia for service abroad, and sent the ironclad Numancia and two gunboats to Melilla (Wikipedia: First Rif War). In addition about 3,000 troops were mobilised in the Spanish ports.
The ironclad Numancia shelled several villages along the Moroccan coast (Wikipedia: First Rif War). A Spanish artillery detachment from Málaga arrived in Melilla.
Following the incident of the Mosque, Moroccans across the province began to joined the Rif militants (Wikipedia: First Rif War). By 5 Oct the Rif force had possibly reached as high as 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.
During the next few weeks a contingent of regular Moroccan troops under Baja-el-Arbi arrived in the area, but failed to restore the situation (Wikipedia: First Rif War). This failure soured Spanish-Moroccan relations. Meanwhile the Rif captured and demolished the forts of Camellos and San Lorenzo. Under cover of the Spanish batteries small parties of Spanish infantry and workmen then erected new earthworks at Cabrerizas and Rostro Gordo.
The gunboat Conde de Venadito steamed in the mouth of the Ouro, anchored there, shelled the Rif trenches, and then returned to Melilla's harbour without sustaining damage (Wikipedia: First Rif War).
5,000 Rif attacked the heights of Sidi Guariach (Wikipedia: First Rif War). Fire from the gunboat Venadito and the Spanish batteries could not prevent the Rif from driving General Margallo and General Ortego back into the citadel and seizing the half-finished field works.
2,000 Spanish under Margallo counter-attacked towards the works near Cabrerizas Altas and Rostro Gordo north of Melilla (Wikipedia: First Rif War; Woolman, 1968). The 3,000 Rif in the trenches held the Spanish as 6,000 reinforcements joined battle. The Rif attempted to outflank Margallo. Margallo seems to had misinterpreted t his, and thought the Rif were thinning out their centre. He immediately charged the Rif trenches but was thrown back with appalling losses. Margallo sounded the retreat but was shot dead moments later. The Spanish detachment collapsed although General Ortega led a rearguard action which prevented a complete Spanish rout and massacre. A young Lieutenant, Miguel Primo de Rivera, was distinguished himself in the action and earned himself the Cross of San Fernando (First Class) and a promotion to Captain (Fleming, 1991). Actual losses were probably higher but the Spanish officially acknowledge at least 70 men killed and 122 wounded. Ortega's telegrams to the Spanish government resulted in reinforcements of three regiments of cavalry and four battalions of infantry the same day.
[(Furneaux (1967) believes the rumour that Rivera shot Margallo for selling rifles to the Rif. Woolman (1968) recounts this rumour but considers it unlikely. He says Margallo died when scouting the outworks; he was shot in the head by a tribeman.]
3,000 Spanish under Ortega drove the Rif from their trenches at Cabrerizas but the siege continued (Wikipedia: First Rif War).
A stalemate ensued (Wikipedia: First Rif War). General Macias replaced Margallo. With ample building materials, engineers, and manual labourers the Spanish continued to enhance their fortifications. Spanish guns in the fortress blocked Rif advances and kept the town clear of invaders. The armoured cruisers Alfonso XII and Isla de Luzon also arrived, and the Spanish navy began an incessant bombardment of the Rif positions. On the other hand Rif forces on the beaches prevented the Spanish Navy's efforts to disembark reinforcements and supplies, and Rif entrenchments and forts around the city blocked communication between the Spanish posts. Only desperate night time sorties kept the Spanish outposts supplied. The Spanish formed search and destroy units from convicts and penal labourers, although led by army officers, to ambush Rif patrols at night. Their combination of brutality and courage terrified the Rif and captured the imagination of the foreign press. During November he Spanish lost 12 officers and 100 men against Rif losses of 500 dead, mostly from bombardment.
The Rif asked to parley as a result of the Spanish naval bombardment, but refused to surrender (Wikipedia: First Rif War).
Despite the fact that operations began over a month before it wasn’t until 9 Nov 1893 that war between Spain and Morocco was officially declared (Wikipedia: First Rif War).
General Martínez de Campos steamed for Melilla with 7,000 reinforcements, bringing the total Spanish presence to two Army Corps, perhaps 25,000 regulars and militia (Wikipedia: First Rif War). The Rif forces had peaked around 40,000. Campos clear the Rif from the city surroundings and rebuilt the redoubt the sparked the whole affair.
In April General Martínez de Campos was appointed Ambassador to Morocco and negotiated peace directly with Sultan Hassan, resulting in the Treaty of Fez signed 25 Apr 1894 (Wikipedia: First Rif War). The treaty favoured the Spanish. Morocco agreed to pay 20 million pesetas in war reparations, pledged to pacify the Northern provinces (i.e. the Rif), and ceded the Melilla hinterlands to Spain. The Spanish could had demanded more, but settled for less in an attempted to appease the British government, who were concerned about the security of Gibraltar.
Sultan Mulay Hassan died and the Court Chamberlain, Ba Ahmed, seized power (Woolman, 1968).
The Spanish-American War lasted from Apr to Dec1898. The USA conquered Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, which turned Spanish eyes to conquest in nearby Morocco.

Ba Ahmed and the 20 year old Abd-el-Aziz became Sultan of Morocco (Woolman, 1968).
1901 - 1908: El Rogui's RebellionAn Arab ex-court scribe, Jilali ben Dris, revolted against the Sultan (Fleming, 1991; Furneaux, 1967; Woolman, 1968). Jilali ben Dris was popularly known as El Rogui ("the Pretender") or Bu Hamara (literally "the man who rides on a female donkey" but referring to a Djinn trickster in local myth). El Rogui's movement lasted from late 1901 until Sep 1908. The rebellion started in the Taza region to the south of the Rif, but spread to cover the area from the Algerian border to Fez. In 1907 El Rogui invaded the Rif Mountains and promptly sold mining concessions to European companies. This action offended the Beni Urriaguel and other central Riffi tribes. The Elder Adb-el-Krim raised a Riffi army, crushed the interlopers in battle, and drove them back south to Taza (1908). The Sultan captured El Rogui in 1909, paraded him through Fez in a cage and then had him shot. [Furneaux calls him Bou Homara, known as Rhogi.] |
El Rogui started a rebellion in the Taza region south of the Rif Mountains between Fez and the Algerian frontier (Fleming, 1991; Furneaux, 1967; Woolman, 1968). Most of the Giata, Tsoul, Branes, Meknasa, and Howara tribes of the northeast rallied to his cause.
Alfonso XIII became king of Spain at the age of 16 (Woolman, 1968).
The Beni Snassen tribe on the Moroccan-Algerian border north of Ujda were causing trouble for the French (Woolman, 1968). Abd-el-Aziz agreed to help the French subdue them, but did nothing. Col. Hubert Lyautey, French commander in the neighbouring Oran Department in Algerian, acted independently, marched over the border and put subjugated the restive tribe. The French didn't leave and the Sultan was powerless to do anything about it.
1904: European Powers Divide MoroccoIn April or October 1904 the French and British agreed to let the French took control of Morocco as long as the coast facing Gibraltar was in weaker Spanish hands (Fleming, 1991, says October; Woolman, 1968, says April). The French gained responsibility for Moroccan administration, economy, and security. In November the French and Spanish governments agreed that the Mediterranean coast of Morocco was a Spanish zone of influence. In practice this made little difference as the Spanish remained in their five fortified towns (?? list them ??). The French continued to push westward into Morocco south of the Spanish Zone.
Kaiser Wilhelm landed at Tangier at the end of Mar 1905 to promote German claims in Morocco (Woolman, 1968).
Representatives of Germany, Morocco, England, France, Spain, italy, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Demark, Russian, and Luxembourg met at Algeciras in Spain (Woolman, 1968). They agreed the Act of Algeciras which effectively confirmed France's rights in Morocco.
In Morocco civil unrest was increasing, resulting in European deaths (Woolman, 1968).
The real authority in the Djebala at this time was Sherif Muley Ahmed el Raisuni - a tyrant, cattle rustler, extortionist, and in the eyes of the western world, a generally bad guy (Fleming, 1991). Many locals, however, viewed El Raisuni as a hero. In 1906 the Sultan sent an army against El Raisuni (Furneaux, 1967). 2,000 Djebelan warriors ambushed and defeated the punitive expedition. [Furneaux (1967) calls him Raisuli.]
Note: Djebala is sometimes spelt Jibala or Yebala.
Due to Moroccan unrest and the resulting French deaths, the French occupied Uxda (May 1907) and Casablanca (Aug 1907) (Fleming, 1991). Urban Moroccan opinion turned against Sultan Abd-el-Aziz and his brother Mulay Hafid drove the Sultan into exile (19 Aug 1907). Mulay Hafid had a decidedly anti-European stance (Woolman, 1968). [Furneaux (1967) says the Moroccan civil war and French occupation occurred in 1908.]
In 1907 El Rogui extended his control into the Rif Mountains (Fleming, 1991; Furneaux, 1967; Woolman, 1968). He started by giving a French company a 99 lease on a factory site in the Restinga, a long peninsular just south of Melilla; the factory promptly began making munitions for El Rogui's forces. Sultan Abdul Aziz landed a harka in the Restinga in the summer of 1907, but despite Spanish support, the Sultan's force's were crushed and driven into Melilla. In Jul 1907 El Rogui gave a Spanish company a 99 year lease on the iron mines at Monte Uixan and the right to build a railway from the mines to Melilla. In Aug he did the same for the lead mines at Monte Afra. Both mine sites were about 19 km southwest of Melilla in the hills of the Beni Bu Ifrur. El Rogui's practice of selling mining concessions he didn't own to European companies upset the local tribes. The Elder Krim began to organise an army from the Beni Urriaguel and other central Riffi tribes to confront the interlopers.
1908: Mayor El Raisuni The French and Abd-el-Aziz were fighting both local insurrections and Mulay Hafid (Woolman, 1968). The Germans were busy selling arms to the rebels. In Aug 1908 Abd-el-Aziz led a Moroccan force against Marrakech. he was betrayed by a tribe he relied on and was forced to retreat. Realising he lacked popular support Abd-el-Aziz abdicated in favour of his brother Mulay Hafid (Nov 1908).
The Sultan wanted to co-opt El Raisuni into the establishment and in 1908 appointed him qa'id of 16 Djebalan tribes and mayor of Arcila (Fleming, 1991).
A Rif army largely organised by the Elder Krim defeated El Rogui's men in battle and drove them south to Taza (Fleming, 1991; Furneaux, 1967). Abd-el-Krim saw active service in this short campaign, but no fighting.
The Sultan captured El Rogui in 1909, paraded him through Fez in a cage, and then had him shot (Furneaux, 1967).
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Riffi tribesmen killed six European railway workers (Fleming, 1991). The governor of nearby Melilla, Gen. José Marina, marched out to protect the workers but suffered a repulse (Furneaux, 1967). Marina called for reinforcements and the Spanish government activated reserve units in the peninsular.
26 Jul 1909:
Tragic Week Activating the reserves in Barcelona caused a strike on 26 Jul and a week of rioting which became known as the Tragic Week (la Semana Trágica) (Fleming, 1991). [Furneaux (1967) says 21-26 Jul but both Fleming and Wikipedia: Tragic Week say the strike was 26 Jul and the rioting followed.]
In one incident the Rif ambushed a column outside Melilla and killed a number of guards (Furneaux, 1967). Troops under Col. Primo de Rivera counter-attacked drove off the tribesmen.
Defeated again, Marina lost two generals (Benito and Vicario) (Furneaux, 1967). This defeat convinced the Spanish public to allow troops to be sent to Morocco. The Melillan garrison was increased from 5,000 men to 22,000 in preparation for an offensive (Fleming, 1991; Furneaux says 40,000). Marina defeated the Rif in a pitched battle in the open plain near Melilla. The massive expenditure on the war caused the Spanish government to block further advances.
Spanish posts of the time were typically a triangle of blockhouses (blocao) (Fleming, 1991). Each blockhouse would have been 6 m by 4 m wooden structures, with sandbags 1.5 m up the walls, and a corrugated iron roof (Preston, 1995). They were surrounded by 3 or 4 strands of barbed wire. A typical garrison for a blockhouse was 21-30 men and these had to be provisioned by armed convoys. The posts tended to be located on hill tops for defence, but typically this meant they were without a water source. So the convoys had to bring in water as well. Occasionally the blockhouses communicated by heliograph and signal lamps.
Miguel Primo de Rivera, now a Colonel, volunteered for duty in Melilla (Fleming, 1991). He served under Gen. Salvador de Arizón and took part in the hard fought battle of Mt. Gurugú. Rivera returned to Spain in Jun 1910.
The Spanish had subdued some of the more easterly tribes by Jan 1910 (Fleming, 1991). They had also pushed out their Melilla enclave to encompass the area from Cape Tres Forcas to the southern inlets of Mar Chica.
1911:
Regulares FormedIn 1911 Dámaso Berenguer founded the first unit of indigenous regular troops (Fuerzas Regulares Indígenas) as a result of studying native units in French employ (??). The Regulares, as they were commonly known, had Moroccan other ranks, Spanish and Moroccan junior officers, and Spanish senior officers. Berenguer left Morocco in 1916 (Fleming, 1991).
In Mar 1911 Sultan Mylay Hafid asked the French to help him maintain his empire (Woolman, 1968). The French occupied Fez (Fleming, 1991).
In Jun 1911 Spanish forces began to venture into the hinterland to establish authority over the tribes of Djebala, Gomara, and the Rif Mountains (Scurr, 1985). In June the Spanish also seized Larache and Alcázarqivir (Fleming, 1991). Officially this was in the interests of the Sultan of Morocco, but it was really to establish Spanish authority. Interestingly, El Raisuni supported the Spanish take over of Larache because "the Spanish are strong enough to help us, but not so strong that they will oppress us" (Fleming, p 40) .
In an ultimately successful attempt to blackmail the French, the Germans sent the gunboat Panther to the closed port of Agadir (Fleming, 1991). The Panther displaced 1,000 tons and was armed with two small cannon and six machine guns (Woolman, 1968). Subsequently, in Nov, the French gave the Germans territory in the French Congo in exchange for German recognition of the 1904 Anglo-French agreement on Morocco. France recovered this territory after World War I.
In the eastern sector a local sheikh, El Mizzian, had been preaching jihad against the Christians (Fleming, 1991). As a result, on 24 August, some Riffi attacked a cartographic detachment of the General Staff under Major Molina, plunging the whole Melillan sector into war. The Spanish public were opposed to offensive action giving El Mizzian an opportunity to build up his forces, including volunteers from as far away as Algeria.
The Kert Campaign was Gen. Gabriel Orozco's attempt to push the Rif back across the Kert River (Fleming, 1991). Primo de Rivera was one of the participants. Following renewed warfare in Morocco Rivera had volunteered for service in the Protectorate in Sep 1911. He commanded the Regiment of San Fernando in the Kert Campaign but returned to the Peninsular following a foot wound on 7 Oct. He was, however, promoted to Brigadier General.
Unchecked by Spanish offensive operations, El Mizzian was in a position to threaten Melilla (Fleming, 1991)
2nd Lt. Franco had his request for transfer accepted 6 Feb and arrived in Morocco 17 Feb (Preston, 1995). His first posting was at Fort Tifasor in the Melilla defences.
"No tribe came to us spontaneously. None gave in without
fighting,
and some of them not until they had exhausted every means of resistance."
Gen. Guillaume, 1953, cited in Woolman, 1968, p. 14
Sultan Mulay Hafid agreed to make Morocco a French Protectorate (Fleming, 1991; Woolman, 1968). The residents of Fez went on a rampage until suppressed by French troops. It would take until 1934 for the French to pacify the country.
Hubert Lyautey became the first French Resident-General in Morocco (Woolman, 1968).
At some point in 1912 El Raisuni led his tribesmen on a looting and extortion trip through the Spanish zone (Furneaux, 1967). Col. Manuel Fernández Silvestre, commander at Larache, sent a contingent to stop El Raisuni, which they did in a pitched battle. Ironically Silvestre was reprimanded and told to treat El Raisuni more cordially.
Primo de Rivera was assigned to Gen. Alfau's staff in Tetuán and participated in the campaign against Raisuni (Fleming, 1991). This made him a major general.
El Mizzian's died in a minor skirmish in late spring (Fleming, 1991).
Franco was confirmed as 1st Lt. on 13 Jun 1912 - solely due to seniority (Preston, 1995).
By mid-June most of the eastern tribes had signed peace treaties (Fleming, 1991).
Sultan Mulay Hafid abdicated in favour of his younger brother Yussef (Woolman, 1968).
1st Lt. Franco was given command of the position of Uixan, protecting the Banu Ifrur mines (Preston, 1995).
The French recognised the Spanish Protectorate in Northern Morocco (Fleming, 1991; Scurr, 1985, says 27 Nov 1912). With Britain a firm French ally - France got Morocco and Britain got Egypt - and Germany placated with territory in the Congo, France took the opportunity to force Spain to accept territorial losses. Spain got 22,000 square kilometres, or about 1/20th of the French area. The Spanish zone was basically the Rif and the Franco-Spanish border was north of the Ouarga/Wergha river (Furneaux, 1967). The Franco-Spanish boundary arbitrarily split some tribes in two, for example the Beni Bu Yahi, Metalsa, and Geznaya in the east (Woolman, 1968). The new Sultan, Mulay Yussef, ratified the agreement on 14 May 1913. Meanwhile the Spanish were convinced the French were selling guns to the tribes in the Spanish protectorate.
The Spanish set up three autonomous military commands in
their zone, one in each of Ceuta (Gen. Felipe
Alfau), Larache (Col. Manuel
Fernández Silvestre), and Melilla (Fleming, 1991). The western Ceuta zone
corresponded to the Djebala. Although the High Commissioner
was the supreme authority in Spanish Morocco, the military commanders only
referred to him in an emergency or where joint military action was called
for. The Sultan's representative in the Spanish zone was called a
Caliph.
Both Millán Astray and Francisco Franco arrived in Melilla in 1912 (Scurr, 1985). In the years leading up to 1920, both men made their names leading Regulares in the Moroccan campaigns. Astray ended up as commander of the 2nd Tabor of Regulares of Larache. Franco fought with the 1st and 2nd Tabors of Regulares of Melilla and the 1st Tabor of Tetuán. Franco's men thought he had divine protection (baraka) (Preston, 1995).
Col. Silvestre arrested El Raisuni and his family, seized munitions, and freed 98 prisoners from the dungeons at Arcila (Fleming, 1991). The Spanish authorities subsequently apologised, forced Silvestre to free El Raisuni, and recalled Silvestre.
El Raisuni settled into his mountain fortress at Tazrut and called the Djebalan tribes to rise against the Spanish (Fleming, 1991).
A Spanish force under Gen. Afrau occupied Tetuán, the capital of the Djebala and chief town in northern Morocco (Fleming, 1991; Furneaux, 1967). Tetuán became the seat of the Spanish Protectorate and hence of the Caliph. The Spaniards began to abuse the inhabitants.
Franco transferred to the Regulares (Preston, 1995). He arrived for duty on 21 Jun 1923 and was posted to the garrison to Tetuán.
El Raisuni brought a strong force to the outskirts of Tetuán and, when riots broke out in the city, he attacked (Furneaux, 1967). The rebellion quickly spread as the Djebalan tribes rose against the Spanish (Fleming, 1991).
The pacific Gen. Alfau couldn't cope with El Raisuni's revolt and the militant attitude of the Spanish Government and either resigned (Fleming, 1991) or was recalled (Furneaux, 1967). Gen. José Marina transferred from Melilla to replace Alfau. Silvestre was reinstated in command at Larache. Spanish troops in the area were brought up to 40,000.
Franco began to make a name for himself through cold-blooded bravery in several operations against El Raisuni (Preston, 1995). Franco won the Military Merit Cross 1st Class for local victory on 22 Sep.
Battle at Beni Salem on the outskirts of Tetuán (Preston, 1995). Franco was promoted to captain as a result.
28 Jul 1914 - 11 Nov 1918: World War OneThe major powers fought World War One (WW1) from 28 Jul 1914 to 11 Nov 1918. There were repercussions in Morocco. Between Jul 1915 - Nov 1918 the Spanish adopted a strategy of temporization against El Raisuni, putting diplomacy before armed might (Fleming, 1991) . |
As the European powers engaged in war, the Spanish adopted a strategy of temporization against El Raisuni putting diplomacy before armed might (Fleming, 1991) . Silvestre opposed this strategy and advocated total war.
German agents were active in both the French and Spanish zones. Abd-el-Malek, the Algerian Chief of the Sultan's police Force in Tangier, became a German agent (Furneaux, 1967). Suspecting his dealings had been discovered he fled to the Rif mountains with an associated called Far and a sack full of German gold. They stirred up the southern Tribes, declared a Holy War against the French, and started attacking French posts. The Sultan, backed by French gold, responded by declaring a Holy War against the Germans. Malek's bands dwindled and he fled to the Spanish zone.
On 8 May 1915 El Raisuni's agent in Tanger, Ali Akalay, was strangled (Fleming, 1991). A subsequent investigation found the Moorish mayor of Arcila and a number of Spanish officers were responsible.
Although not implicated in the Ali Akalay murder both Silvestre in Larache and Marina in Ceuta were removed from their posts (Fleming, 1991). Gen Francisco Gómez Jordana, the commanding officer in Melilla, was promoted to High Commissioner.
The industrious, capable and tactful Jordana managed to win over Raisuni and the two signed an accord in Sep 1915 (Fleming, 1991). El Raisuni called off his men in return for regaining control of the Djebala.
Spanish forces took the mountain top village of El Biutz 9-10 km to the west of Ceuta (Preston, 1995). The rebels had been massing in the hills, and El Biutz was their main stronghold as it dominated the road from Ceuta to Tetuán. Although the village was defended by entrenched machine guns and riflemen, the Spanish launched a frontal assault up the hill in the early hours of 29 Jun 1916, led by the 2nd Tabor of Melilla. As the attack progressed more Tribesmen poured down the back of the hill behind the Spanish catching them in a cross fire. The Spanish forces took heavy casualties, including the commander of the leading company of Regulares. Captain Francisco Franco assumed command of this company, broke through the enemy encirclement and played a significant part in taking the village. Sometime during the action Franco was shot in the stomach, but continued to direct his men. Franco was subsequently promoted to Major as a result of his actions (28 Feb 1917, with effective from 15 Jun 1916) and posted back to Spain .
In protest at their meagre wages in the context of high inflation, a number of infantry and cavalry officers established Juntas throughout peninsular Spain (Fleming, 1991).
WW1 came to and end.
High Commissioner Jordana died of a heart attack at his desk of (Fleming, 1991).
Dec 1918: Abd-el-Krim Returns HomeIn Dec 1918 Abd-el-Krim took a leave of absence from his post in Melilla and returned to his home village (Fleming, 1991).
Abd-el-Krim recalled his brother, Mhammed Abd-el-Krim, from Madrid (Fleming, 1991). The two brothers and their uncle, Abdselam, began to organise a war band (harka) to meet the inevitable Spanish invasion. A harka was a group of warriors of any size.
At some point in 1919 the Spanish Office of Native Affairs stopped paying certain notable Beni Urriaguel their pensions, including Adb-el-Krim and his brother (Fleming, 1991). The money went instead to younger more pro-Spanish members of the tribe.
"No more soldiers need shed their blood"
( Berenguer quoted in Furneaux, 1967, p. 50)
Dámaso
Berenguer, now a General, returned to Morocco as High Commissioner for the
Protectorate and Generalissimo of the Spanish forces in Morocco (Fleming, 1991;
Furneaux, 1967). Berenguer's
instructions were to stop temporizing and put El Raisuni out of business.
However, after conferring with the French to the south Berenguer adopted a policy slow conquest, hence the quote above, rather than
the military approach used in the past. He would use money and other
inducements to divide and conqueror the tribes. Where possible he
would use friendly Harka against their hostile neighbours. Berenguer drew
up a three year plan for the pacification (Preston, 1995). He would start
with the Anyera to the east of Ceuta, then move on to the Djebala (including
Tazarut and Xaüen) Berenguer reached Tetuán
in Feb 1919 and tried to put his strategy into
operation.
Note: Xaüen is also spelt Xauen, Chaouen, Shawan, Chauen, Chefchaouence and Chechaouene (Woolman, 1968).
?? one of my sources says Berenguer returned in Aug 1919. Must find it. ??
As part of phase one of Berenguer's plan, the Spanish occupied Alcazarseguir in the Anyera territory near Ceuta (21 Mar 1919) (Preston, 1995). El Raisuni, reacting to the new aggressive stance of the Spanish authorities, broke off communications, and occupied the hills around Tetuán recommenced guerrilla war by attacking Spanish supply convoys (Fleming, 1991). Berenguer sent troops to dislodge him (Furneaux, 1967). In the campaigns of 1919-1922 the Spanish troops operating in the western sector built hundred of small blockhouses and road side encampments from Tetuán to Xaüen and up the Lau River to the Mediterranean.
Troops of Berenguer Tetuán and Gen. Emilio Barrera in the south launched a campaign to suppress El Raisuni and pacify the Djebala (Fleming, 1991). They pushed into the rugged uplands south of Tetuán and drove El Raisuni back into his mountain retreat of Tazrut .
In the eastern sector, the Spanish under Gen. Luis Aizpuru cautiously advanced into the Central Rif (Fleming, 1991).
The Spanish occupied Fondak fort on the Tangier-Tetuán road in the western sector (Fleming, 1991).
Millán Astray studies the French Foreign Legion at Tlemcen and Sidi bel Abbés with a view to creating a Spanish equivalent (Scurr, 1985).
By the winter Gen. Luis Aizpuru had established a front from the mouth of the Kert River south to Zoco del Telata (Fleming, 1991)
1920-26: Rif War or Third Rif WarThe Third Rif War started in 1920 with the failed Spanish attempt to conquer the
Djebala. The next year saw the spectacular Spanish defeat known in Spain as the
Disaster of Annual where the forces of Abd-el-Krim destroyed the 14,000
strong army of Gen. Silvestre (Scurr, 1985)..
Indecisive fighting continued until the French joined the fray in
1925. The French attacked from the south while a Spanish expedition
landed at Alhucemas Bay and attacked from the north. Abd-el-Krim surrendered to French
authorities on 27 May 1926 but it took until 10 Jul 1927 before Spanish Morocco
was declared pacified. |
In 1920 the three military commands of Larache, Ceuta, and Melilla were made subordinate to a single military command (Fleming, 1991).
The Spanish public reacted badly to the new bloodshed in Morocco and demanded more efficient officers (Furneaux, 1967). The King gave Gen. Silvestre, a man known to rely more on 'cojones' ('balls') than military acumen, command of the troops although Berenguer retained his role as High Commissioner and title of Generalissimo (Fleming, 1991).
A Royal Order authorised the formation of the Regiment of Foreigners (Tercio de Extranjeros) - known popularly as 'La Legion' (Scurr, 1985). Millán Astray commanded and Major (Commandante) Francisco Franco Bahamonde was his second in command (from 27 Sep 1920) (Preston, 1995). Although called a "Foreign Legion" in reality 90% of the unit were Spanish in origin. This brought the total Spanish forces in Morocco up to 63,000 with 24,000 being in Melilla (Furneaux, 1967).
The Elder Krim died and Abd-el-Krim's succeeded him as judge of Axdir (Furneaux, 1967).
Abd-el-Krim organised a great council of the Caids of the Rif at Kama, but failed to convince them of a joint policy against Spanish aggression (Furneaux, 1967). He did manage to come to an agreement with the Temsaman, a small tribe based to the east of the Beni Urriaguel on the road from Melilla. Although they wouldn't commit men to the conflict the Temsaman agreed to light watch-fires when the Spanish invaded.
Implementing phase two of Berenguer's plan, three Spanish columns took the mountain city of Xaüen with relatively little bloodshed (Fleming, 1991; Preston, 1995; Scurr, 1985). Viewed as a holy city by the Berbers, Xaüen was also El Raisuni's major city. Tucked into a deep gorge in the southern Djebala, the historic fortified redoubt was viewed as unconquerable. The city was taken largely because of a military Arabist, Colonel Alberto Castro Girona. Girona entered the city disguised as a charcoal burner, then bribed and threatened the local notables into surrender. The Spanish then began to build small posts and blockhouses in the surrounding countryside, and had a strong policing force to guard the Tetuán-Xaüen road. Franco and the Legion were amongst the guards. Meanwhile the Spanish forces moved east along the Gomara coast.
16 Oct 1920: Legion Depot at Dar Riffien The Legion established their depot at Dar Riffien (Scurr, 1985).
By 31 Oct 1920 the Legion could parade three battalions (Banderas) (Scurr, 1985).
The Legion fights its first battle (??). The 2nd company was attacked and Balthasar Queija Vega became the first Legionary to die in combat.
Preston (1995) points out that the Legion were a brutal lot, including Franco. Prisoners were mutilated and killed. Prisoners were often decapitated and their heads exhibited and/or given as gifts to visitors.
The Legion experienced its first significant fight. The 4th company of 2nd Bandera was attacked when guarding the road between Zoco el Arbaa and Xarquia Xeruta. Captain Don Pompilio Martinez Zaldivar was killed. In response, the 5th and 6th companies decimate the enemy and drive them off.
In the west Berenguer resumed his gradual penetration by slowly surrounding El Raisuni's stronghold at Tazarut (Preston, 1995). His men began a ring of blockhouses surrounding Tazarut. By 29 Jun 1921 the blockhouses formed a line between Xaüen and Uad Lau, and a line between Xaüen and Alcazarquivir. The Legionaries were part of Colonel Castro Girona's column whose task was to establish a line of blockhouses between Xaüen and Uad Lau (Scurr, 1985).
But in Feb 1921 the King transferred Silvestre to Melilla in the eastern sector (Furneaux, 1967), where he replaced the cautious Aizpuru (??). Silvestre instructions from the King were to break the Moroccan deadlock.
Silvestre took Monte Arruit in preparation for advancing across the Amekran River (Preston, 1995). Silvestre laughed in response to Abd-el-Krim's warning that if Silvestre crossed the Amekran the tribes would resist in force. The general viewed the Riffi as "Petticoat Soldiers" (Silvestre quoted in Furneaux, 1967, p. 54).
Major Jesús Villar set up a fortified post at Abarrán, five km west of Annual in the eastern sector (Fleming, 1991). Villar left 200 Regulares and 50 Spanish (including two captains and a lieutenant) to defend the post and withdrew with his escort. By mid-afternoon 1,000 Riffi, in two groups, had surrounded the post. One of the Regulares fired ten shots as a signal to the rebels within and without the fort to attack. 179 loyal troops were killed in the fighting, including the officers. The survivors were forced to retreat to Buy Meyan.
Alarmed at the events at Abarrán Berenguer sailed to Sidi Dris and summoned Silvestre to a conference (Fleming, 1991). Berenguer instructed Silvestre to make no further advances, an order he complied with. over the next six weeks Abd-el-Krim built up his forces. In contrast the only reinforcements Silvestre asked for was permission to create a new unit of Regulares.
The 1st and 3rd Banderas fought off Rif bands at the hill positions of 'Muñoz Crespo' and Buharrat (Scurr, 1985). The Legion suffered 13 dead (including one officer) and 27 wounded.
The Spanish lines of blockhouses finally surrounded Tazarut in the west (Preston, 1995).
Abd-el-Krim directed Riffi insurgents to increase harassment of Silvestre's lines in the eastern sector (Fleming, 1991).
Riffi attacked Silvestre's advanced posts at Igueriben and Buy Meyan (Fleming, 1991). Igueriben was besieged
The Riffi attacked all along Silvestre's line - particularly at Igueriben (Fleming, 1991). All efforts to relieve Igueriben failed. Silvestre began to telegram Berenguer for reinforcements.
Silvestre mobilised all disposable forces in Melilla to send to the front (Fleming, 1991). Essentially the entire Spanish force in the eastern sector was about to be concentrated at the front.
Late in the afternoon Silvestre arrived at Annual with the reinforcements from Melilla (Fleming, 1991). Silvestre promptly organised 4,000 men into a relief column for Igueriben. Twice Silvestre led cavalry charges toward the besieged outpost, but was driven back by Riffi artillery and machineguns, captured from the Spanish at Abarrán and now entrenched on the road to the Igueriben. Silvestre ordered the evacuation of Igueriben, but only two of the defenders made it out.
At 1000 hours on 22 Jul 1921 Silvestre ordered the retreat from Annual (Fleming, 1991). The withdrawal soon became a rout and the Spanish army of 14,000 men was destroyed by only 3,000 Riffi under Abd-el-Krim.
By evening of 23 Jul Abd-el-Krim's men had occupied the crests of the Gurugú Mountain overlooking Melilla (Scurr, 1985). Behind them scattered Spanish forces made desperate stands against the victorious tribesmen. It took 3 weeks for the Riffi to take all the isolated outposts. There were major massacres at outposts near Melilla, Dar Drius, Monte Arruit (9 Aug) and Nador (2 Aug). The Spanish suffered 13,192 casualties over three weeks, including 8,000 dead and hundreds captured. Silvestre was one of the dead.
In the western sector the planned assaulted on Tazarut was called off on 22 Jul 1921 so Legion reinforcements could be sent east (Preston, 1995; Scurr, 1985). At 0400 on 22 Jul 1921 hours Franco force marched the 1st Bandera and 4th Company of the 2nd north towards Fondak and Tetuán, arriving at 0945 on 23 Jul. There they were joined by the rest of the 2nd Bandera and trained to Ceuta, where they boarded a ferry for Melilla.
24 Jul 1921:
Legion Arrives in MelillaCivilian morale at Melilla was boosted when the 1st and 2nd Banderas of the Legion arrived at 1400 hours (Scurr, 1985). The Legion occupied defensive positions in the suburbs.
Reinforced by two tabors of Regulares of Ceuta, the two Legion Banderas occupied the hills of Sidi Hamed and
the Atalyón but were not allowed to advance further (Scurr, 1985). Three Spanish
Infantry Battalions took over garrison duty in Melilla.
Over the next few weeks detachments of the Legion fought several actions against the Riffi tribesmen, either defending their sandbagged blockhouses, or escorting pack-mules to the forward positions (Preston, 1995; Scurr, 1985).
From his position in the outskirts of Melilla, Franco watched the last Spanish defenders of Nador being overcome (Preston, 1995). The authorities denied his request to relieve the siege.
Monte Arruit fell to the Riffi (Preston, 1995). Primero de Rivera's brother, Fernando, was one of the dead (Fleming, 1991).
A large Spanish convoy was blocked trying to reach a strongpoint at Casabona (Scurr, 1985). Franco led the escort column - 2nd Bandera, two companies of the 1st, and two tabors of Regulares of Ceuta - against the Riffi tribesmen entrenched in positions dominating the road (Preston, 1995). Bayonet charges and close quarter fighting were the order of the day. The Legion suffered more than 90 casualties and the Regulares about 100.
This was the beginning of what was called the reconquest (Reconquista) (Fleming, 1991).
Men from an army Disciplinary Battalion relieved the defenders of the exposed blockhouse at Dar Hamed, known as "the bad one" (El Malo) (Scurr, 1985).
The Rif surrounded 'El Malo' at Dar Hamed. Riffi artillery fire wounded the Spanish officer in charge of the blockhouse, and killed several men (Scurr, 1985).
15
volunteers (under Corporal Seceso Terroro) from the 1st Bandera on Atalayón
reached the blockhouse as darkness fell (Scurr, 1985). Two
men were wounded as they crossed the wire. The Rif attacked again, but were held by the Legionaries' rifle fire and
grenades. Toward midnight the Riffi
brought up their artillery and pounded the blockhouse into rubble - there were
no survivors.
The Spanish launched a major attacked against Nador, 16 km to the south of Melilla (Scurr, 1985). At 0700 hours the 1st and 2nd Banderas, the Regulares of Ceuta, and three Spanish Infantry Battalions advanced from Sidi Hamed. The Spanish suffered fire from Riffi artillery on Gurugú Mountain, but the Riffi positions were bombarded by a more impressive Spanish array including planes, artillery, and the guns of the offshore fleet. Riffi machine gun and rifle fire halted the advance at the Amadi gorge. Millán Astray was wounded in the chest and evacuated. Franco led the 1st and 2nd Banderas along the heights above the gorge. Although exposed to heavy fire the Legion cleared the gorge edge of tribesmen as far as Monte Arbós. The two Banderas suffered 33 casualties.
The Confederal Republic of the Tribes of the Rif, or the Republic of the Rif in short, was created on 18 Sep 1921 (Wikipedia: Republic of the Rif). Axdir was the capital and the Riffan was the currency. Abd-el-Krim became head of state (Emir of the Rif) on 1 Feb 1923. Spanish and French forces dissolved the Republic on 27 May 1926.
Within the Republic Abd-el-Krim maintained tight control on the various kabyles by handpicking the leaders, and putting Beni-Urriaguel in as their lieutenants ... and to keep and eye on them (Fleming, 1991). Influence on the kabyles outside the Republic relied on Beni-Urriaguel military reputation and terror. Feuds were outlawed and the towers near every house were demolished. Of course not all kabyles were keen to accept Riffi overlordship and there was some inter-tribal fighting, at least in the Djebala.
Also on 18 Sep 1921 the Legion entered Nador where mutilated Spanish corpses had littered the town since the Disaster of Annual - the smell was appalling (Scurr, 1985). The Legionaries spent the next six days burying the dead.
Franco with the 1st and 2nd Banderas and the Regulares of Ceuta successfully assaulted ravines and trenches at Sebt (Scurr, 1985). The Legion suffered 150 casualties. Franco and his men were the vanguard of Gen. Berenguer's new westward offensive toward the River Kert; Gen Sanjurjo was the operational commander.
Sanjurjo's column took Atlatlen (Scurr, 1985).
Sanjurjo's column took Segangan (Scurr, 1985).
Heavy fighting on the crests of Gurugú Mountain resulted in 121 casualties for the Legion (Scurr, 1985).
In the western sector, the new 4th Bandera conducted bayonet charges against rebel 'harkas' (bands) around Monte Magán (Scurr, 1985).
24 Oct 1921: Spanish Occupy Monte ArruitThe Legion occupied Monte Arruit in the eastern sector (Scurr, 1985). They had to bury the corpses of the 800 Spanish that tried to make a stand here during the retreat from Annual in July. [Preston, 1995, says 23 Oct.]
Oct 1921 also saw the expansion of the Legion (Scurr, 1985). A 4th Bandera was raised at Dar Riffien and a third rifle company was added to each Bandera. The 13th and 14th Companies joined the 1st and 2nd Banderas respectively on 24 Oct.
More bayonet charges by the 4th Bandera at Monte Magán (Scurr, 1985). They suffered a total of 72 dead and 212 wounded during the fighting of 23 and 28 Oct.
The Legion gained a 5th Bandera (Scurr, 1985).
Millán Astray arrived back in Ceuta (western sector) although his chest wound hadn't fully healed (Scurr, 1985). In conjunction with larger Spanish columns, he spent the next couple of months leading the 3rd, 4th and new 5th Banderas in operations in the Beni Arós and Djebala regions.
18
Nov 1921: Action on Uisán MountainBack in the eastern sector, the 1st and 2nd Banderas, with some native police, scaled a steep ravine and took the old forts on Uisán Mountain (Scurr, 1985). As the weather deteriorated over the next few days, operations were extended to Ras Medua, Tauriat Hamed and El Harcha.
The Spanish captured Dar Drius on 10 Jan 1922, an important rail depot in the eastern sector (Scurr, 1985; Fleming, 1991, says 9 Jan 1922). Franco was prevented from wrecking vengence on the inhabitants of the village (Preston, 1995). [Preston (1995) says 8 Jan.]
During a retreat from Dráa el Asef in the western sector on 10 Jan 1922, Millán Astray was wounded in the leg and evacuated again on 18 Jan (Scurr, 1985). This retreat was also notable for an incident where the 8th Company of the Legion (in the 3rd Bandera) resorted to knife work when fighting off ten times their own numbers.
After an attack by Riffi, the Legionary defenders of a blockhouse near Dar Drius appeal for help to the Spanish commander of the village (Preston, 1995). The officer ordered his entire Legionary contingent to the rescue. Major Franco decided that 12 was enough and called for volunteers. When the entire unit stepped forward, Franco chose 12 and they made their way to the blockhouse. After a night of fierce fighting Franco and the 12 volunteers returned carrying the bloody heads of 12 tribesmen.
Millán Astray arrived at the Legion camp at Dar Drius (Scurr, 1985).
Gen. Berenguer authorised Gen. José Sanjurjo, commanding in the eastern sector, to resume operations against the Beni Said and Beni Ulixech (Fleming, 1991; Scurr, 1985).
The six French 1921 Schneider CA-1 of the armoured battery were the first Spanish tanks into combat (14 Mar 1922) (Tanks: Spanish).
The first action of the first Spanish tank company (12 French Renault FT-17s) was against the Beni Said kabyle on 18 Mar 1922 (Tanks: Spanish). This was a joint operation between the tank company and Legion infantry. They were to drive the Beni Said from the towns of Tugunz and Ambar. Rain caused leaky roofs and mechanical problems due to wet ignitions. None the less the attack started at 0600 hours. Advancing at 4mph the tanks soon out-distanced the legionaries. Facing tanks was a new experience for the Beni but they learnt quickly. When rifle fire didn't stop the FT-17s the tribesmen climbed on the tanks and stabbed and shot through the vision slits. With no supporting infantry the tanks could do little about this. With on-going ignition failures, gun failures, and lacking infantry support, the tanks called it a day and withdrew. The Spanish left two FT-17s on the field.
Millán Astray led the 1st and 2nd Banderas on an advance on Ambar (Scurr, 1985). The Legion suffered 86 casualties during fierce but unsuccessful counter-attack by the rebels.
After months of manning outposts and escorting convoys the 3rd and 5th Banderas joined the final occupation of Tazarut - El Raisuni's stronghold, although the man himself escaped (Fleming, 1991; Scurr, 1985).
Berenguer resigned for the 4th time after the Supreme Military Court issued its indictment against him (Fleming, 1991). This time it was accepted. His replacement was Gen. Ricardo Burguete.
In Aug Burguete began negotiations with El Raisuni (Fleming, 1991; Preston, 1995). These ended with the Spanish giving El Raisuni authority over the central Djebala in exchange for formal submission to the Caliph (4 Dec 1922). Similar negotiations with Abd-el-Krim failed so Burguete recommenced operations in the eastern sector.
A 6th Bandera joined the Legion (Scurr, 1985).
After considerable opposition, the Spanish took Tizzi Azza (Fleming, 1991). This was a fortified hill top position to the south of Annual in the eastern sector (Preston, 1995). This brought the Spanish roughly back to the line held by Silvestre in Jun 1921.
The Rif pre-empted a Spanish attack from Tizzi Azza by taking the dominating heights above the town and firing down into the garrison (Preston, 1995). They forced the Spanish to dig in for the winter and inflicted 2,000 casualties over the course of the siege.
2nd Bandera started work on an advanced camp for the Legion at Ben Tieb (Scurr, 1985).
Due to political considerations Lt. Col. Rafael de Valenzuela Urzais replaced Millán Astray as commander of the Legion (Scurr, 1985). Valenzuela had founded and led the Group of Regulares of Alhucemas.
The majority of the Riffi grain came from the fertile alluvial plain around the Uarga River on the border of the French and Spanish Protectorates (Fleming, 1991). Most of the Beni Zerwal in the centre was allocated to the Spanish zone, but in 1922-23 the French began to interfere in the internal affairs of this kabyle.
At his own request Franco left the Legion for a posting back to his old regiment in Oviedo (Scurr, 1985).
Also on 17 Jan 1923 the military command of the protectorate was decentralised (again) (Fleming, 1991).
Acting against the wishes of the army, the Spanish government paid Abd-el-Krim for the return of the prisoners taken at Annual in Jul-Aug 1921 (Fleming, 1921). The 45 officers (including the second in command, General Navarro), 245 soldiers, and 40 civilians cost the Spanish people 4,270,000 pesetas.
Abd-el-Krim became head of state of the Republic of the Rif (Emir of the Rif) on 1 Feb 1923 (Wikipedia: Republic of the Rif). Fleming (1991) says Abd-el-Krim also announced the creation of the Republic, but according to Wikipedia: Republic of the Rif the actual creation was in 1921.
Luis Silvela, a civilian, replaced Gen. Burguete as High Commissioner (Fleming, 1991).
Abd-el-Krim initiated negotiations with the Spanish, but they lead nowhere (Fleming, 1991)
With the failure of the negotiations in April, the Rif recommence aggressive action (Fleming, 1991).
In mid-1923 Abd-el-Krim organised his pan-Riffi military force including Beni Urriaguel regulars supplemented by tribal harkas (Fleming, 1991).
A Spanish supply convoy left Tafersit for the outpost at Tizzi Asa, besieged since November the previous year (Scurr, 1985). Col. Gómez Morato commanded the column, while Lt. Col. Valenzuela led the vanguard (1st, 2nd and 4th Banderas, and a Tabor of Regulares). Fire from entrenched tribesmen halted the Regulares at Iguermisen ravine. With Legion machineguns pinning the rebel harka in place, the 1st and 2nd Banderas attacked the right flank and the 4th to the left. Morato on the extreme right ordered a general attack. Valenzuela sent the 1st and 2nd Banderas charging up the slope toward the enemy entrenchments. During the grenade and bayonet work amongst the trenches, Valenzuela and his escort were shot down. The scattered Legionaries rallied to their nearest officer and drove the Riffi from the trenches. This allowed the convoy to reach Tizzi Asa (Preston, 1995). Legion casualties were 186 including the dead Valenzuela.
The Spanish tank company ( 12 French Renault FT-17s) were used to protect the convoy to Tizzi Asa (Renault FT-17 Tanks in the Rif War).
The newly promoted Lt. Col. Franco was given command of the Legion (Preston, 1995; Scurr, 1985).
Another round of fruitless peace negotiations (Fleming, 1991).
9,000 Riffi were besieging the outpost at Tifaruin outpost near the mouth of the river Kert (Scurr, 1985). On 22 Aug 1923 the Spanish broke the siege. The Regulares of Alhucemas and Melilla were blocked on the direct approach, so Franco led the 1st and 2nd Banderas in a wide flanking movement to the right of the enemy entrenchments. His attack on the Riffi flank and rear allowed to the Regulares to break through to Tifaruin.
During Sep 1923 the Riffi attacked 70 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 28 of the 30 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Gen. Miguel Primo de Rivera staged a successful coup d'état in Spain (Scurr, 1985).
The war in Morocco had cost the Spanish 2,300,000,000 pesetas since 1909 and 23,000 casualties since 1916 (Fleming, 1991).
By early autumn 1923 the most important tribes in the Djebala had agreed to cooperate with Abd-el-Krim (Fleming, 1991). This was bad for El Raisuni as his supporters bailed. One of his youngest and most able commanders, Ahmed Heriro, defected to Abd-el-Krim and became a major Rif leader in the Djebala.
During Oct 1923 the Riffi attacked 38 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 23 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
The Spanish and El Raisuni failed to come to agreement at Sidi Musa (Fleming, 1991). The Spanish no longer viewed El Raisuni as a force in the Djebala.
About this time the Spanish again tried to negotiate with Abd-el-Krim (Fleming, 1991).
In the deliberate effort to rely more on volunteer and indigenous troops, the Spanish began to send conscript units home (Fleming, 1991). 29,000 conscripts were sent home early. Another 26,000 were to be discharged in the first three months of 1924. Plans for the new draft were also reduced, from 92,000 in 1923 to 78,000 in 1924 (i.e. down by 20%).
Rivera created two new reserve divisional brigades in the southern ports of Alicante and Almeria (Fleming, 1991). Each included four cavalry regiments, two artillery batteries, and an infantry company. There purpose was to provide immediate reinforcements to Africa, in the case of an emergency.
The Riffi intensified their attacks against Tifaruin and Tizzi-Azza in early Nov 1923, however overall Riffi activity was low in November compared to the preceding and following months (Fleming, 1991). During Nov 1923 the Riffi attacked 10 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 7 of the 30 days of the month.
During Dec 1923 the Riffi attacked 48 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 23 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Gen. Castro Girona wrote that the protectorate was passing through a period of ominous quiet (Fleming, 1991). In this quiet period Abd-el-Krim was extending his control into the Uarga region and the Gomara. El Raisuni increasingly relied on Spanish troops to control his own followers.
During Jan 1924 the Riffi attacked 37 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 22 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Riffi harkas invaded the Gomara and imposed a tribute system to support their occupation (Fleming, 1991). The Riffi were also fighting certain Djebalan qa'ids in Jan-Feb.
Rivera gave the High Commissioner back overall civilian and military command of the protectorate (Fleming, 1991).
To allow defence in depth the Melilla, or eastern, sector was subdivided into a vanguard zone (zona de vanguardia) and a rearguard zone (zona de retaguardia) (Fleming, 1991). The former were the advanced positions on the Silvestre Line. A Spanish column was based at each of Dar Quebdani, Dar Drius and Tafersit. Franco's Legion was based at Ben Tieb. In the rear zone the the Spanish concentrated troops at Tistutin, Nador, Segangen, and Melilla.
Organisation in the western sector remained unchanged (Fleming, 1991).
To the south the forces in the French Protectorate had been steadily declining, reaching a low of 65,258 in 1924 (Fleming, 1991).
Abd-el-Krim paid Ahmed Heriro - a key follower of El Raisuni's in the Djebala - to throw his lot in with the Riffi (Fleming, 1991).
During Feb 1924 the Riffi attacked 48 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 20 of the 29 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
A Riffi harka under Ahmed Heriro besieged M'Ter on the Mediterranean (Fleming, 1991). The siege lasted a month and was tight enough that the Spanish had to supply the output from the air. The Riffi had two captured guns and shelled the outpost every day.
Abd-el-Krim also began four months of exploratory raid, leading up to his offensive on 27 Jun 1924 (Fleming, 1991).
Spanish intelligence believed Abd-el-Krim controlled the coast to Gomara and inland as far as the boundary with the French protectorate (Fleming, 1991).
Franco led his Banderas in numerous operations to open up the supply routes to Tizzi Asa, Sidi Mesaud, and other outposts (Scurr, 1985).
A troublesome month for the Spanish. During Mar 1924 the Riffi attacked 59 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 22 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Riffi forces attacked Tizzi Azza, Azib de Midar, and Afgrau (Fleming, 1991). Tizzi Azza was the hardest hit of the Spanish outposts and the defenders resorted to hand-to-hand combat to drive off their attackers.
The Spanish cruiser Cataluña arrived at M'Ter but two Riffi guns caused extensive damage and forced the ship to limp back to Cadiz for repairs (Fleming, 1991).
Columns under Lt. Col. Franco and Lt. Col. Llanos broke the siege of Tizzi Azza (Fleming, 1991). The Spanish suffered 22 dead and 167 wounded against estimated Riffi losess of 120 dead and 70 wounded.
A troublesome month for the Spanish. During Apr 1924 the Riffi attacked 58 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 23 of the 30 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Terrorist Attack in Tetuán (Fleming, 1991).
The French forces on the northern border occupied the area north of the Uarga river, in the area of the Beni Zerwal, to secure it against the Riffi (Fleming, 1991). By the end of Jun 1924 the French had a 120 km long line of posts and blockhouse from Biban in the west to Kifan in the east. Negotiations also created a pro-French camp within the Beni Zerwal.
During May 1924 the Riffi attacked 39 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 19 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Sanjurjo took over command in Melilla about this time (Fleming, 1991).
On 1 May 1924 400 of the Beni Urriaguel regulars besieged the advanced post of Sidi Mesaud in the eastern sector (Fleming, 1991). The garrison commander called for reinforcements and Rivera started a bombing campaign.
The Spanish air units were concentrated in Melilla on 5 May (Fleming, 1991). Spanish planes bombed the area between Sidi Mesaud and Axdir on 6, 8, and 9 May. The aim was the systematic "destruction of villages and livestock, the dispersion of all manner of concentrations and markets and above all, the burning of crops" (p. 140). The Spanish used incendiary, fragmentation, and poison gas. None-the-less the siege of Sidi Mesaud continued. And the air attacks also continued ... for four and half months on an almost daily basis.
In three days of hand-to-hand combat columns of Legionnaires and Regulares under Lt. Col. Franco and Lt. Col. Pozas broke the siege of Sidi Mesaud (Fleming, 1991).
During Jun 1924 the Riffi attacked 38 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 21 of the 30 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
By June Abd-el-Krim had about 80,000 men in arms due to the support of Beni Said, Beni Hassan, Beni Hozmar and many others in the western sector (Fleming, 1991; Scurr, 1985). They were well supplied with weapons and ammunition including 100 artillery pieces. (Scur says 200 artillery pieces, but Fleming has a convincing argument for at most 100 guns.)
The Spanish intelligence services noted Ahmed Heriro's forces had increased and that he was poised near the Uad Lau Line (Fleming, 1991). An attack was obviously imminent.
27 Jun - 13 Dec 1924: Lau CampaignOn 27 Jun 1924 2,000 Riffi and Djebalan warriors attacked the weak Uad Lau Line in the western sector (Fleming, 1991). By 17 Jul they were closing in on Tetuán-Xaüen Road and by 5 Sep has surrounded Xaüen. Several Spanish columns fought their way to the beleaguered city (10-30 Sep). The Spanish evacuated the Xaüen outposts (2 Oct - 14 Nov) and then abandoned the city (15-17 Nov. The subsequent retreat to Tetuán was fiercely contended but the survivors reached safety by 13 Dec. The retreat left Ahmed Heriro's forced only 10 km south of Tetuán. |
The Riffi attacked the weak Uad Lau Line in the western sector (Fleming, 1991). The attackers were Beni Urriaguel regulars under Ahmed Heriro and harkas of the Djebalan kabyles of the Beni Said, Beni Hassan, and Beni Hozmar. Rivera thought there were 2,000 in the Riffi force. The attack initially had two prongs. A number of Spanish outposts along the river were quickly cut off and subjected to daily attacks. The worst attacks were against Koba Daras and Hoj.
During Jul 1924 the Riffi attacked 47 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 22 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Abd-el-Krim added a third prong to the attack on the Uad Lau Line (Fleming, 1991).
Gen. Luis Bermudez de Castro replaced Gen. Montero in Ceuta (Fleming, 1991). The Spanish reinforced the western front with troops from the Peninsular and from Melilla.
Two columns under Gen. Julian Serrano Orive relieved the Koba Daras and Hoj outposts (Fleming, 1991).
Spanish intelligence reported that Heriro had received 1,200 reinforcements from the central Rif (Fleming, 1991).
The Riffi began to close in on the southern section of the Tetuán- Xaüen road (Fleming, 1991).
During Aug 1924 the Riffi attacked 31 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 18 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Abd-el-Krim launched a new series of attacks on the Uad Lau Line (Fleming, 1991). The attacks focused on Infertan, Tazza, and Solano to the southwest and west of Cobba d'Arsa, and on the Uad Lau Valley between Dar Acobba and Taguesut. By 8 Aug the Riff had cut Spanish communications to the south and to Xaüen in particular.
Sanjurjo in the eastern sector launched various reconnaissance probes to relieve pressure on the west (Fleming, 1991). Abd-el-Malek - now a high paid supporter of the Spanish - led his harka on one such probe on 7 Aug 1924. Despite support from the Spanish air force his band was driven back by a Riffi counter-attack and Abd-el-Malek was killed in the retreat.
In the peninsular a brigade under Gen. Alberto Castro Girona was prepared for immediate assignment to Morocco (Fleming, 1991).
In the western sector of the protectorate the Spanish organised four columns under Gen. Serrano, Gen Grund, Gen. Riquelme, and Lt. Col. Permúy (Fleming, 1991). The columns had orders to rescue the cut off positions but the Riffi were well entrenched and most of the local kabyles were hostile, if not in open revolt, so this was easier said than done. In the end the rescue attempt was a complete failure. For example, Column Riquelme was held on the road north of Xaüen for three weeks.
Riffi attacked Afrau and Tifarauin and it took 2,000 Spanish and two days to break the siege (Fleming, 1991).
20
Aug 1924: Spanish Withdrawal The Spanish began withdrawing from the Lau sector of the western sector (Scurr, 1985). [Seems a bit early for the planned withdrawal, which was actually announced 10 Sep, so I suspect this is the unplanned response to Riffi atttacks.]
After the reinforcements of Jul-Aug the Spanish had 100,00 men in the Protectorate (Fleming, 1991). But with the failure of the four relief columns the Riffi had cut the roads and communications, had captured a number of small positions and forced the Spanish to evacuate others. The Ifartán encampment was abandoned after an eight day siege. The commander of the blockhouses at Sentafa had the position burned, then committed suicide, leaving his surviving men to be slaughtered by the Riffi. All the positions around Buharrax were out of water and under siege with no hope of rescue. Because Column Serrano was blocked Solano had to be abandoned. Various small Spanish detachments disappeared on the roads.
During Jan 1924 the Riffi attacked 26 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 15 of the 30 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Eight more Peninsular battalions were sent to Morocco (Fleming, 1991).
By 5 Sep the Abd-el-Krim's harkas control the Gorgues Mountains to the south-east of Tetuán (Scurr, 1985). 10,000 Spanish soldiers (including the 6th Bandera) were surrounded in the Xaüen district, mainly in the city itself.
Spanish columns including Banderas 2 through 5, spend September clearing the enemy from their positions in the Gorgues Mountains, thus opening the road to Xaüen (Scurr, 1985).
A column under Queipo de Llano - subsequently considered battle hardened veterans - rescued Column Riquelme on the Tetuán-Xaüen road allowing both to retreat to Ben Karrich (Fleming, 1991).
Rivera arrived in the protectorate to take charge (Fleming, 1991).
Rivera announced his play to evacuate the 400 exposed outposts in the three most threatened sectors: the Lau valley, the Tetuán-Xaüen road, and the gorges of the Beni Arós (Preston, 1995; Scurr,1985). The troops were to withdraw to the more defensible coastal fringes. Abd-el-Krim stepped up his attacks as the Spanish withdraw. According to Fleming (1991) about 233 posts in the western sector were actually abandoned.
Queipo de Llano veteran column and Girona's newly arrived brigade fought their way 20km down the Tetuán-Xaüen road (Fleming, 1991). At El Fondak de Ain Yedida waited for reinforcements before the final push to Xaüen.
After a minor confrontation Rivera relieved Queipo de Llano of his command (Fleming, 1991). Further more on 24 Sep Queipo was sentenced to a month's prison sentence.
Riquelme took over command in Larache (Fleming, 1991).
The Riffi had artillery in the Gorgues Heights 7 km south of Tetuán and could fire into the capital (Fleming, 1991). Two columns under Castro Girona and Frederico Berenguer (Dámaso's brother) attacked the heights on 18 Sep 1924. It took Lt. Co. Franco's Legionnaires until 22 Sep to clear the area.
On 23 Sep two Spanish columns left Tetuán for Xaüen, under Serrano and Col. Enrique Ovila (Fleming, 1991; Scurr, 1985). Column Girona joined them on the drive south. The 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Banderas formed the vanguard of these columns. [Preston (1995) says the legion led Column Girona alone, but this is unlikely.]
A fourth column, advancing from the west under Col. Carrasco, was forced back to Larache by Djebalan opposition (Fleming, 1991)
Riquelme began to abandon the advanced posts in the kabyle of Beni Aros (Fleming, 1991).
Gen. Serrano's column reached the small outpost of Zoco el Arbáa, halfway between Tetuán and Xaüen (Fleming, 1991).
The vanguard of Column Girona, under Franco, relieved the Spanish positions at Xeruta and Dar Akoba (Fleming, 1991).
An advanced Spanish force under Col. Virgilio reached Xaüen (Fleming, 1991).
Gen. Serrano's column reached Xaüen on 30 Sep after fierce fighting (Scurr, 1985).
During Oct 1924 the Riffi attacked 39 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 20 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
Column Girona arrived in Xaüen on 2 Oct (Scurr, 1985).
As soon as the city was relieved parties of Legionaries and Regulares evacuated the Spanish personnel from the 100 outposts around Xaüen (Scurr, 1985). Casualties were heavy with some of the rescue parties being almost destroyed (Fleming, 1995). The Riffi demanded a ransom of two rifles for each man to be evacuated but rarely kept to the bargain. All Spanish forces were concentrated in the city itself by 14 Nov.
General Primo de Rivera, the Spanish dictator, named himself High Commissioner of Morocco (Fleming, 1991; Scurr, 1985). Rivera tried to initiate peace talks with Abd-el-Krim. As a result it seems that Abd-el-Krim ordered Ahmed Heriro to reduce any offensive action, but the negotiations came to nothing.
Millán Astray, now on the staff of the High Commission, had his left arm shattered in an action near Fondak fortress (??). The arm subsequently had to be removed.
All Spanish forces had been successfully withdrawn from the Beni Arós sector (Scurr, 1985). The 2nd Bandera were responsible for protecting the withdrawal.
During Nov 1924 the Riffi attacked 27 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 16 of the 30 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
By Nov 1924 the Spanish had some 125,000 troops in Morocco (Fleming, 1991).
By 5 Nov 1924 141 Spanish advanced posts had been evacuated and the men concentrated in Xaüen (Fleming, 1991). According to Preston (1995) the Spanish had 10,000 soldiers in Xaüen, but Fleming (1991) gives this as the number in Girona's column alone when they left.
15 Nov - 13 Dec 1924: Spanish retreat from XaüenBetween 15 and 19 Nov all Spanish troops and civilians (along with some Jewish and Moroccan civilians) evacuated Xaüen covered by Franco with five Banderas of the Legion (Fleming, 1991; Scurr, 1985). Once again the Spanish were organised in two columns under Generals Serrano and Girona. The Beni Urriaguel attacked the flanks of the retreating columns. Franco's legionaries protect the retreating columns in appalling weather conditions against heavy attacks. The two columns were consolidated into one when Serrano was killed (19 Nov). The surviving Spanish reached Tetuán on 12 Dec. |
Girona led the way with 10,000 men on the evening of 15 Nov and reached Zoco el Arbaa on 18 Nov with little trouble (Fleming, 1991).
El Raisuni, who was in Xaüen, refused to retreat with the Spanish, and instead headed for his fortress at Tazarut (Fleming, 1991).
Just after midnight on 17 Nov Franco silently pulled his rearguard out of Xaüen, leaving straw dummies in Legionary uniforms to man the walls (Scurr, 1985).
Column Girona reached Zoco el Arbáa on 18 Nov with little trouble (Fleming, 1991).
Due to heavy rain and Riffi attacks 19 Nov found the Spanish spread between Dar Acobba and Zoco el Arbáa (Fleming, 1991). Some 7,000 Riffi and Djebalis under Ahmed Heriro attacked the spread out troops. Heriro overran the post of Dar Acobba. Capt. Arredondo's 1st company of the 1st Bandera was completely wiped out when covering the withdrawal from Xeruta (Scurr, 1985). Gen. Serrano and a fair number of other Spanish were also killed at Xeruta. Despite these loses the surviving Spanish continued to fight their way up the road.
With Gen. Serrano dead the Spanish were consolidated into one column at Zoco el Arbáa (Scurr, 1985). It took until 25 Nov for all the survivors to reach the post (Fleming, 1991). The Spanish remained at Zoco el Arbáa for three weeks under 24 hour a day harassment from Heriro's harkas.
During Dec 1924 the Riffi attacked 40 of the 76 front line Spanish positions in the eastern sector; Riffi attacks occurred on 21 of the 31 days of the month (Fleming, 1991).
On the southern border the French and Spanish authorities secretly began to cooperate to stop the flow of contraband into the Rif Republic (Fleming, 1991). French officers began to stop convoys entering the Spanish Protectorate. These efforts we taking their toll on the Riffi by Feb-Mar 1925.
Rivera ordered that no more posts would be evacuated (Fleming, 1991).
The Spanish at Zoco el Arbaa broke out on 10 Dec and headed for Ben Karrich (Fleming, 1991; Scurr, 1985).
Still protected from heavy attack by the legionary rearguard, the Spanish column limped into Tetuán (Scurr, 1985). The last units entered on 13 Dec 1924 (Fleming, 1991). Legion casualties in the entire retreat were about 1,000; the rest of the column experienced a similar number of casualties.
The retreat left Ahmed Heriro's forced only 10 km south of Tetuán (Fleming, 1991). The northern Djebalan kabyle of Anyera took the opportunity to rise in revolt, disrupting communications between Tetuán, Ceuta and Tangier.
The Spanish began several blockhouses southwest of Tetuán to close access to the San Martín River valley (Fleming, 1991).
Gen. Saro and Lt. Col. Franco were ordered to suppress the Anyera (Fleming, 1991).&n